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ABSTRACT: As demonstrated by the 2011 East Japan Great Earthquake, earthquakes are a major risk 
contributor to nuclear power plants (NPPs). Seismic isolation is one of the most effective alternatives for 
enhancing the seismic safety of NPPs. When we consider seismic isolated NPP structures, we should 
consider the seismic risk of a seismic isolated NPP structure. Unlike conventional structures, NPPs do 
not see improved seismic safety only by the reduction of seismic ground motion. In the case of 
conventional structures, seismic isolation systems should be considered for only a decrease of 
acceleration responses. In the case of seismic isolated NPP structures, however, because isolation 
displacement is an important issue for the seismic safety of an NPP structure, seismic risk should be 
considered. When considering the seismic risk of a seismic isolated NPP structure, seismic PRA 
methodology can be used. A seismic PRA procedure can be divided into a seismic hazard analysis, a 
seismic fragility analysis, and an accident sequence analysis. The additional seismic hazard analysis is 
not needed compare to the conventional NPPs. Seismic fragility should be reconsidered because of the 
change of input seismic motion. An accidence sequence analysis also should be reconsidered. In this 
study, seismic fragility assessment methodology for seismic isolated NPP structures are considered. For 
the assessment of seismic fragility of seismic isolated NPP structures, target structures, systems, and 
components were selected. Failure mode and criteria were also taken into account. For the assessment of 
seismic fragility of seismic isolation devices, previous ultimate test results were reviewed. As a result, 
seismic fragility assessment methodologies are proposed in this study. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Even though seismic isolation is one of the most 
effective approaches for enhancing the seismic 
safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs), NPPs 
should satisfy a safety goals. In the case of 
conventional structures, a decrease of response 
acceleration is enough for applying a seismic 
isolation system. For NPPs, even the response 
acceleration decreases if NPPs cannot satisfy 
safety goals, and the seismic isolation system 
design consequently fails.  
Performance goals of a seismic isolated NPP 
should match those of non-isolated counterparts. 
According to risk-based regulations, the 
performance goals of NPPs require core damage 
frequencies (CDFs) and large early release 
frequencies (LERFs) to be below the specified 
standard. The performance goals of NPP structures 
may be presented by re-analyzing the 
aforementioned goals of NPPs from a structural 
perspective. With regards to earthquakes, RG1.208 
and ASCE 43-05 of the NRC are applicable.  
 
The CDFs and LERFs for NPPs are reviewed by 
regulatory authorities as per relevant laws. In general, 
the CDF and LERF applicable to new NPPs are 10E-
05/yr and 10E-06/yr, respectively. However, these are 
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aggregates of all possible risks that may occur in a 
single NPP, not just seismic events, and therefore, the 
risk of earthquakes alone should be lower. The 
performance goals of seismic isolated NPPs with 
regards to earthquakes may thus be determined in 
consideration of all other risks.  
Unlike in conventional NPPs, the main 
components of seismic isolated NPPs are divided into 
isolation systems and umbilical lines. A seismic 
isolation system consists of the isolation layer formed 
by a group of seismic isolators, along with the 
foundation and basemat, while umbilical lines refer to 
elements that are supported across the isolation 
interface. Once the performance goals for these two 
items are satisfied, the performance goals for 
conventional NPPs must also be met. As seismic 
isolation systems have no redundancy, their 
performance goals should guarantee safety with higher 
reliability or demonstrate proactive mechanisms to 
prevent damage. The performance goals of umbilical 
lines shall be defined depending on their importance in 
relation to the safety of NPPs.  
For performing a seismic risk assessment for 
seismic isolated NPP structures, a seismic hazard 
assessment is the same as for non-isolated NPP 
structures, although in the case of seismic fragility, it 
is totally different than that of non-isolated structures. 
Target structures and systems are different than those 
of non-isolated NPPs. A floor response spectrum of 
seismic isolated NPP structures is totally different than 
that of non-isolated NPPs. Seismic fragility 
development methodologies for seismic isolated NPP 
structures are shown in this paper. Seismic fragility 
assessment for a seismic isolation system containing a 
seismic isolator, a basemat, and a pedestal are 
considered. Seismic fragility assessment methodology 
for umbilical lines including interface piping systems 
are also considered in this paper.  
 
2. RISK OBJECTIVES OF SEISMIC 
ISOLATED NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANTS 
A typical diagram for a seismic isolated NPP 
is shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1, all nuclear 
power plant structures located on the isolation 
system consist of a basemat, an isolator, pedestals, 
and a foundation. As in Figure 1, a moat, a moat 
wall, and clearance to hard stop (CHS) are new 
concepts compared to non-isolated NPPs. 
The moat is a space to allow for relative 
movement, and the CHS is a distance large 
enough to limit pounding.  
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic diagram for seismic isolated 
nuclear power plants (USNRC, NUREG Draft, 2016)  
 
The NUREG Draft shows risk objectives of 
seismic isolated NPPs. The NUREG Draft defines 
performance goals of seismic isolator units and 
systems, CHS, and isolator unit as: 
• Isolation unit and system: 90% probability 
of each isolator and the isolation system 
surviving without loss of gravity-load 
capacity at the mean displacement under 
EDB GMRS loading 
• Clearance to Hard Stop (CHS): equal to or 
greater than the 90th percentile isolation 
system displacement under EDB GMRS 
loading 
• Isolator unit: Prototype testing must be 
performed on a sufficient number of 
isolators at the CHS displacement 
 
3. SEISMIC FRAGILITY OF SEISMIC 
ISOLATION SYSTEM 
3.1. Failure Mode of Seismic Isolation System 
A seismic isolator is a structural element that 
is simultaneously subject to shear, compression, 
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and tensile forces. Therefore, the key failure 
modes and criteria of seismic isolators shall be 
determined and assessed by combining these three 
types of loads. Key failure modes can be classified 
into shear, compression, tensile, compression-
shear, and compression-tensile. Failure criteria 
are determined based on the capacity to maintain 
the three critical functions of vertical load bearing 
capacity, restoring force toward the origin, and 
damping. However, cases in which the limit-state 
is deemed to be affected by distortion are assessed 
under the assumption of the maximum possible 
distortion under the EDB load.  
There are three general failure modes for 
rubber bearings: Shear, compression-shear 
(buckling), and compression-tensile. All failure 
modes of seismic isolators are schematically 
shown in Figure 2. As an earthquake load involves 
shearing behavior, the possibility of pure 
compression or pure tensile force is negligible. In 
addition, as the structure of a NPP is designed for 
the greatest possible match between the stiffness 
center and the mass center in the superstructure of 
a seismic isolation system, as well as to have a 
large basemat, changes incurred by distortion in 
each seismic isolator are expected to be minor. 
 
 
Figure 2: Schematic diagram of failure mode for 
seismic isolator 
 
Failure modes and criteria should be defined 
prior to the calculation of the seismic fragility of 
a seismic isolation system. The failure modes of a 
seismic isolation system may be classified as 
follows. 
The first failure mode of a seismic isolation 
system is a failure mode of a group of seismic 
isolation systems. Such a failure mode includes 
loss of restoring force toward the origin and loss 
of vertical bearing capacity. 
The second failure modes are failure of the 
basemat and foundation. These failure modes are 
deformation of the basemat due to loss of vertical 
bearing capacity of some seismic isolators and 
deformation of the foundation due to the 
settlement of the ground below the foundation.  
The third failure modes involve failure 
caused by a hard stop collision. These failure 
modes are shearing of the hard stop exceeding the 
displacement for shear failure criteria of isolators 
due to impact load and tensile failure of seismic 
isolators due to the overturning moment caused by 
the hard stop collision. 
3.2. Failure Criteria of Seismic Isolation System 
The failure criteria of each failure mode are 
herein summarized.  
Failure criteria of a group of seismic isolation 
systems can be defined as follows: When the 
restoring force falls below a certain proportion of 
the superstructure’s weight following a horizontal 
deformation. The acceptable number of seismic 
failed isolators are calculated in accordance with 
the failure criteria of the foundation.  
Failure criteria of the basemat and foundation 
should be considered as: Some isolators lose their 
vertical bearing capacity and exceed their elastic 
limit; the deformation of the foundation causes 
structural damage to the superstructure.  
Failure criteria based on hard stop collision 
can be defined as: Velocity of hard stop collision 
exceeding the displacement for shear failure 
criteria. Velocity exceeding the tensile failure 
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margin of isolators caused by an impact-induced 
overturning moment. 
For the determination of failure criteria of a 
seismic isolation system, failure tests for scale 
model seismic isolators were performed. For the 
failure test of seismic isolators, 20 specimens 
were used. Through the test, failure mode and 
criteria can be determined according to the 
isolation unit and isolator devices. Even though a 
failure mode of seismic isolation unit was 
buckling failure, a global failure mode of seismic 
isolation system might be shear failure. Figure 2 
shows the relation between shear strain and 
vertical load for the shear failure test of a seismic 
isolator. As shown in Figure 3, failure of an 
isolation device can be determined according to 
the failure mode. It can be determined peak load, 
80% of peak load after passing the peak load, and 
secondary hardening and shear failure can be 
determined as failure of a seismic isolator. One of 
the interesting things is that even the peak load, 
80% peak load, and second hardening points are 
different according to the vertical load cases, but 
shear failure capacities do not show many 
differences. The definition of each failure point is 
shown in Figure 4. The failure of a seismic 




Figure 3: Relation between shear strain and vertical 
load for different seismic isolator tests 
 
 









80% of Peak Load
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4. SEISMIC FRAGILITY OF 
UMBILICAL LINES 
4.1. Seismic Fragility Assessment Framework of 
Piping Elements 
In order to evaluate the seismic fragility of 
piping elements, the following procedure should 
be followed.  
 
① Conduct sensitivity analysis of elbow 
component responses 
② Sample random variables 
③ Determine the input relative displacement 
motions 
④ Undertake detailed modeling of critical 
elbow components 
⑤ Perform numerical simulations of elbow 
components 
 
For the sensitivity analysis of elbow 
component responses, selection of random 
variables and ranges, evaluation of the responses 
of elbows under cyclic loading (stress, strain, etc.), 
and the definition of the important random 
variables should be conducted.  
In the case of the sampling of random 
variables, a DB should be constructed for each 
random variable by coupon tests or measurement 
and the probability distribution function of 
random variables should be defined. 
For determining the input relative 
displacement motions, determine the number of 
cycles from the strong motion duration and the 
representative input relative displacement 
motions (sine-wave form). 
Afterward, detail numerical modeling should 
be performed for elbow components. 
When performing the numerical simulations 
of elbow components, evaluate the response at 
critical points (crowns, etc.), compute the failure 
probabilities with regard to the load intensities 
(e.g., MRD), and compute the component level 
fragility parameters (e.g., in terms of MRD). 
4.2. Seismic Fragility Assessment Framework of 
Piping System  
 
In order to evaluate the seismic fragility 
assessment of the piping system, the following 
procedure should be followed.  
 
① Sample random variables 
• Define important random variables 
• Evaluate the probability distribution of 
random variables 
② Produce simplified modeling of global 
piping system 
• Best estimate model of piping system 
• Construction of input model set 
considering random variables 
③ Perform numerical simulations of piping 
system 
• Selection of input ground motions 
• Evaluate the relative displacements 
between the ends of critical elbow 
components 
④ Undertake detailed modeling of critical 
elbow components 
⑤ Perform numerical simulations of elbow 
components 
• Evaluate the response at critical points 
(crowns, etc.) 
• Compute the failure probabilities w.r.t. the 
load intensities 
⑥ Estimate the fragility capacity of piping 
system 
• Estimate the median capacities & 
uncertainty parameters at each critical 
component 
• Condensate the fragility curves at each 
critical point 
• Compute the piping system level fragility 
parameters 
5. SEISMIC FRAGILITY OF SEISMIC 
ISOLATED EQUIPMENT 
The components of seismic isolated NPPs are 
not inclusive of the umbilical lines crossing the 
isolation interface, and are divided into those 
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located at the superstructure and other 
components. The components in the 
superstructure should be assessed by calculating 
the FRS of the seismic isolated structure, while 
the latter may be assessed with the same approach 
used for conventional NPPs. The FRS of the 
seismic isolated structure should be calculated by 
reflecting its characteristic in that its nonlinearity 
increases along with seismic intensity. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Even though seismic isolation is one of the 
most effective methodologies for enhancing the 
seismic safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs), a 
NPP should satisfy a safety goals. For the 
validation of seismic isolation systems for NPPs, 
a seismic PRA for seismic isolated NPPs should 
be performed. In order to perform a seismic PRA, 
a seismic fragility assessment methodology for 
seismic isolated NPP structures was explained in 
this paper. Failure modes and criteria for seismic 
isolators and seismic isolation systems were also 
discussed. Additionally, seismic fragility 
procedures for umbilical lines and seismic 
isolated equipment in NPPs are summarized in 
this paper.  
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